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From Cyborgs to Organic Model and Back:
Old and New Paradoxes of Gender
and Hybridity
ALICIA H. PULEO
Born during the late Scholastic period, nominalism is the philosophical
theory which refuses to accept the ontological existence of general
notions. It only considers particulars and asserts that no universals
exist, only individual things and creatures. This stands in opposition
to Plato’s world of Ideas, ideas based on an independent reality which
precedes beings. For nominalism, a general concept such as ‘man’ is only
a useful communication tool and does not refer to a common essence
existing beyond individuals from which an abstract notion is constructed.
This is one of the few doctrines emerging from scholasticism to have
such a contemporary feel. As Ernst Bloch demonstrated in his Leipzig
lectures, this doctrine reflected the beginning of the crisis of feudalism.1
This order, which determined each person’s life from birth to death
starts to lose legitimacy around the end of the thirteenth century with
the development of commerce and urban centres. From Duns Scotus’s
nominalism emerged the modern subject as a dynamic process of self-
constitution2 and foundation of reality. Heidegger’s famous critical
interpretation of the concept of subjectum will present this nominalism
as a construction of the world’s image.3
Nominalism could therefore be another name for modern individua-
lism. This doctrine’s refusal of essences allowed so-called natural borders
to be crossed. In its rejection of an essentialist standpoint, nominalism
favoured the transgression of the social limits of feudal orders, of race,
and of sex; or, to name it more precisely, of gender. It thereby plugs into
the tradition of civil and political liberties.
Nominalism’s emphasis on the singularity of each individual and
its reluctance to accept groups and hierachies as universal entities
opened the door to a legitimate transgression of sexual borders. The
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masculine and the feminine in effect endorsed the expression of a hidden
essence which can produce monsters when not duly respected. Since
an immutable and sacred natural order no longer exists, blood and
characteristics are able to mix. By the second half of the eighteenth
century, Diderot conceives the living being as the combination of
sensitive molecules (‘molécules sentantes’).4 He suggests the possibility
of hybrids created by science. Mixing species: what for Diderot was a
daring hypothesis has today become a reality.
The etymology of the word ‘hybrid’ goes back to the Latin hybrida
which means ‘mixed blood’. Yet this word also refers to hybris,
excessiveness, so detested in Ancien philosophy. In the Dictionnaire
Larousse, three different uses of the adjective ‘hybrid’ are found. The
first refers to selected cross-breeding within one species; the second
discusses plant breeding within the same species or involving different
species; finally, the third, broader use introduces the word ‘hybrid’ when
something is made of ‘disparate elements’. The noun ‘hybrid’ refers
to any ‘hybrid animal or plant’ and can refer to genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) and new biotechnologies. One wonders, therefore,
whether the idea of excessiveness is not taking over from that of simple
mixing, given the obvious risks of changes in natural ecosystems that
these organisms introduce in an environment already threatened by
contamination and climate change. The problem, in my view, lies in the
confusion between biological limitations defined by natural history (e.g.
difference between species) and limitations established by oppressive
cultural practices (e.g. role models, status, norms and restrictions linked
to gender). While the former limitations are the product of an inescapable
process of evolution, even if they are harmful to human and non-human
life on earth, the second are devices aiming at the domination by some
human beings of others and of the non-human world.
In this article, I shall consider the concept of gender as a particular case
of hybridity derived from nominalism. This notion has led to important
social transformations and to significant epistemological changes which
have been visible in the social sciences for the last thirty years or
more. In order to do so, I shall first outline how women were
conceptualized during the era dominated by essentialism, be it religious
or supposedly scientific. I shall then examine the epistemological and
social changes linked to the emergence of the notion of genre which
will be opposed to that of sex as a cultural, even disciplinary component
imposed by society on anatomical differences. Finally, I shall focus
on the recent resignification of the concept of gender due to a radical
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constructivism which aims to mask any trace of the concept of sex
below that of constructed gender, of cyborg and of artificial body
construct. I shall argue that, in certain cases, techno-feminism’s belief
that science liberates women leads to a lack of critical outlook towards
the economic-technological system. In particular, I shall consider the
feminist theoretician Donna Haraway’s hope of a ‘monstrous world’5 free
from gender constraints and where those hybrids named GMOs could be
used positively.
FROM THE FALL TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SPECIES
The principal monotheistic religions introduced man as the model of
what is properly human. Woman was only an inferior, subservient being,
a defective copy of the original intended by God. Whether she belonged
to our species was even questioned. This flawed, sometimes malevolent
creature introduced Evil into the world. This idea is shared by many
mythologies, ranging from Greek mythology to Amazonian traditions.
In versions excluding the tragedy of the Fall and in simply ontological
interpretations, it is also found in the texts of the most recognized
philosophers. In his Politics, Aristotle associates women with slaves and
animals, all instrumental tools for the Greek citizen. Neither defeated
Barbarians, nor women, nor animals possessed what defined the free
man: reason. In The Banquet, Plato considered love towards women as an
inferior desire which produced carnal children, subjugated to the cycle
of birth and death, while love between men was an attraction between
equals, implied spirituality and was destined to be immortalized in great
works of philosophy, law or poetry.
The image of woman as fallen Nature crossed the centuries in many
cultures. We find her with Eve and Pandora at the birth of Western
civilization. As we know, curiosity had led Pandora to open the box
which contained all the evils of the world. Eve’s story is similar. In the
Middle Ages, a large proportion of religious men argued that women
had to endure suffering and be entirely submissive because they had had
sexual relations rapports with the Devil, and thus made Adam a sinner.
Christian iconography often represents Eve with a curvy figure and frizzy
hair which imitate the snake’s coils in order to suggest the ambiguous
nature of the first woman.
With the process of secularization of modernity, science takes over
from religion as the worthy advisor in people’s lives. This does not
imply the disappearance of religion. In fact, for a long time, women were
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associated with zealously religious collectives. In nineteenth-century
France and Spain, liberals criticized women’s bigotry. It thus gave them
an argument to refuse them the right to vote, as they stated that women
would predominantly vote for political parties in favour of the clergy.
What is more, during the Enlightenment period, a current of thought
affirmed the power of education in order to transform what seemed to be
the manifestation of the essence of sexes. Some thinkers insisted on the
social and constructed aspects of inequality between men and women.
They even expressed the idea that some physical differences are the fruit
of civilization. Knowledge of other cultures brought by traveller’s stories
played a decisive role in the development of this criticism of essences.
At the dawn of anthropology, a debate took place about the innate or
learned features of femininity and masculinity. For instance, comparing
the feminine weakness of Europeans to the endurance of American Indian
women, Madame d’Épinay blamed the customs which constrain and
limit the movements of women’s body in the name of decency. In contrast
to Rousseau, both the Marquis de Condorcet and Mary Wollstonecraft
note that faults and prejudices identified in women only reflect a lack
of education. For these thinkers, the equality of all men must be the
equality of all human beings, free to develop beyond the definition of
their sex.
By contrast, most Enlightenment thinkers, such as Rousseau and
Kant, interpret the word ‘man’ with exclusive reference to the masculine
sex. Under their influence, women were denied the right to vote. Neither
were they given any civil rights, such as the right to manage their
own possessions. They were to be eternal minors submitted to the
authority of their fathers first, then of their husbands. In the area of
science, the discourse of medicine, accepted as philosophical due to
its mix of metaphysical principles and empirical observation, endorsed
women’s exclusion from studying at university. Around the middle of
the eighteenth century, Pierre Roussel wrote a series of treatises on
the feminine sex which contributed to limit women’s role to that of
breeder.6 An impenetrable barrier dividing nature from culture and
public from private spaces was thus constructed. This philosophical
medicine belongs to what Michel Foucault named the ‘dispositif de
sexualité’ (‘deployment of sexuality’).7 Foucault emphasizes the total
hysterization of the woman’s body. It was thought that the womb
controlled the whole feminine body. In the eighteenth century, it was
even believed to have the capacity move around the whole of the body
and to produce hallucinations. The woman was thus perceived as a being
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dominated by sex. The political consequence drawn from this so-called
scientific knowledge was a strict division of gender roles. Men had to be
in charge of all activities deemed necessary for the progress of humanity,
such as education, democratic and rational organization of cultural,
economic domains, and sanitary policies. By contrast, women, considered
closer to nature and subjugated to biology as animals were, had to focus
on improving the species. As regards sexual division of labour, as in
many other areas, the old Biblical discourse gradually gave way to the
authority of science. The distribution of spaces for men and women
was made on the basis of the irrefutable difference between feminine
and masculine essences. Freud’s theory, in spite of its comparative
sophistication, inherits nevertheless the fundamental principles of this
hierarchization of sexes, practised by this strongly sexist medicine.
From the middle of the nineteenth century, some women refused
to accept the exclusive role of devoted mother and chaste spouse tied
to the home. On the one hand, suffragettes and activists of socialism
and anarchism, on the other, ‘women of ill repute’ began to resist
established norms, prompting a violent misogynistic reaction. In the
area of philosophy, it reaches its peak with Otto Weininger’s Sex
and Character.8 Just like Henry James, he states that the suffragettes’
demands for the right to vote and to work as professionals are due to
the fact that they are not real women, but ‘hommes manqués’. According
to the young Austrian thinker, women and Jews are impure beings and
should be eradicated. The enormous popularity of his book shows the
degree to which he expresses widespread feelings at the time.
Science relentlessly persisted in its attempts to prove the weakness
of the feminine brain. Philosophers such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche
and Weininger go back to a misogynistic discourse.9 In art, there is
a reaction against women’s resistance to adjust to the Victorian model
of the ‘Angel in the house’. The woman who does not accept her fate
is considered a monster. The Eternal Feminine appears in numerous
paintings as the sorceress Circe, goddess of metamorphoses. It is also
represented by the seductress Salomé, the vampire or the mermaid.
Women are frequently associated with animals. They embody the blind
force of a threatening Nature which needs to be controlled. Women,
Jews, blacks and working-class people are represented at the time as
inferior beings, more bound by the senses than are the middle classes.
At the end of the nineteenth century sexism, racism and classism are
nurtured by fantasies of hybridity.10 Woman embeds Man in animality
and holds him back from his destiny’ of progress and spirituality. This
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discourse of animalization of the Other pre-empts the ideological bases
of the Holocaust and of the Second World War.
THE CONCEPT OFGENDER AND ITS IMPACT ONTHE SOCIAL SCIENCES
After the Second World War, Simone de Beauvoir used principles
of Existentialist philosophy to fight biologistic discourses concerning
the fate of woman. In her canonical work on feminism, The Second
Sex (1949), the author argued that women are submitted to an unjust
subordination. As an Existentialist philosopher, she considered human
life as a project, as a perpetual choice. Her famous sentence ‘on ne naît pas
femme, on le devient’ (‘one is not born but rather becomes, a woman’)11
denounced the Eternal Feminine as an oppressive mystification. Noting
the wide array of options offered to men and comparing it to maternity
conceived as the unique fate for women of her era, she concluded that
society constructs femininity at the expense of the development of the
capabilities of half the human race. Today, one might add to Simone de
Beauvoir’s famous statement: ‘One is not born man either, but rather,
becomes one’. The concept of gender can help us to discover elements of
social origin in our identity.
The nominalist approach regarding sex found support in the clinical
research of the 1950s. The American doctor John Money defined gender
within the framework of the social determining of sex in hermaphrodite
children. He maintained that an individual, in spite of his/her genetic,
gonadic and hormonal sexual belonging, will behave according to the
sex that has been determined by his/her family environment. Since
its inception, this theory has been criticized heavily because, although
it does not deny the existence of biological data, it considers that the
weight of cultural elements is decisive in the subjectivation process. His
concept of ‘gender role’ referred to attitudes, gestures, behaviours, ways
of moving, speaking and playing which are characteristic of masculine
and feminine behaviour. Money asserted that gender identity becomes
established around eighteen months. It might result from a process in
which biological and social factors intervene.
During the following decade, the concept of gender was gradually
adopted by medical and social sciences. New research horizons open up.
Robert Stoller, Professor of Psychiatry at the University of California,
was the first psychoanalyst to make a distinction between sex and gender.
At the end of the 1970s, women theoreticians of what is known as the
‘second wave’ of feminism adopted the concept of gender as a key capable
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of unlocking power relations in the social fabric at macro andmicro levels.
Kate Millett considered the research of Money and Stoller as proof of
the cultural origin of the sexual structure of personality, that is to say,
of gender.12 Combining the clinical category of gender with the notion of
politics understood as power relations, as defined by the Frankfurt School,
these feminists transformed it into a critical weapon against inequality.
Far from expressing emergent biology, gender would be a hybrid in the
sense of ‘made of disparate elements’. Here are the reasons why norms
and gender stereotypes vary according to ears and cultures.
Thinkers such as Kate Millett and Shulamith Firestone compared
the gender category with that of class and race. The input of this
generation of young women in the New Left and in the African-
American Civil Rights movement favoured theoretical bridges among
these three categories. Shulamith Firestone went as far as announcing a
future when pregnancies will happen in laboratories, thus freeing women
from the reproductive task.13 When the concept of gender develops in
sociology and political feminist theory, sexed identity becomes one of
the components of a complex feedback system. As social organization,
the gender system also refers to other elements such as sexual division
of labour, stereotypes, norms, sanctions and discourses legitimizing the
system, based primarily on essentialism.
In a pioneering article written in 1971,14 the sociologist Nicole-
Claude Mathieu, member of the editorial board of the journal Questions
Féministes, states that out of the three main variables used in sociology
and psycho-sociology, the first to have been defined according to
sociological rather than psychological or biological criteria was the socio-
professional or social class category. This meant that they were not just
described, but studied within their context. Later on, similar studies were
conducted for the age category. Only the sex category remained. Yet a
conceptualization of social sex was lacking, Mathieu observes. Ten years
later, in an article entitled ‘Women and Theories about Society: Notes
on Theoretical Effects of the Anger of the Oppressed’,15 the sociologist
Colette Guillaumin summarizes theoretical changes in the social sciences,
defined as the mental face of concrete relations: relationships between the
sexes, considered as belonging to nature, become social relationships, and
this leads to a criticism of the sexual division of labour or of the inequality
of access to wealth. Sex collectives will not be considered any longer as
pre-existing elements but as the result of a power relationship. ‘Women’s
problems’ or ‘the women’s condition’ are no longer identified as such.
Instead, the social system is studied with new tools which allow the
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analysis of sex domination and unmask the connection between ideology
and concrete relationships even more clearly than in the case of the
conflict between classes or to the conflict caused by imperialism.
Later on, Carolyn Merchant’s, Evelyn Fox Keller’s and Sandra
Harding’s epistemological research would go further, showing gender
bias in the construction of the natural sciences, not only in the way these
sciences conceptualize sexes, but also in their outlook on the world. The
switch from the old image of Nature as a feminine organism full of vital
energy, brought about by the modern doctrine of mechanism, will be the
object of passionate debates.
MONSTERS AND CYBORGS: UTOPIA OR DYSTOPIA?
A postmodern nominalism emerges in the 1990s. The gender concept
tends to be substituted to that of sex. Monique Wittig established herself
as a pioneer of this current with her 1980 article ‘La pensée straight’
(‘Straight Thought’, 1992), published for the first time in the journal
Questions Féministes,16 in which she stated that the lesbian is not a woman
since the word woman refers to a relational category which is the product
of compulsory heterosexuality. She thus opened the way to a radically
constructivist theorization centred on sexuality and which will later be
connected to the Foucauldian concept of ‘savoir-pouvoir’ (knowledge-
power).
This line of research, deriving fromNietzschean perspectivism, argues
that there is no reality that is not already an interpretation. This is
why sex should not be discussed as a biological reality independent
from gender. Thomas Laqueur thus undertakes a detailed history of the
transformations of body perceptions in theWest, in order to demonstrate
that a construction is always at stake.17 Taking a different approach, in
Gender Trouble (1990) the American philosopher Judith Butler applies
Austin’s notion of performative utterance to gender, according to which
gender would only be the result of the repetition of the norm which
precedes it. Gender therefore masks its normative characteristics and
appears to be ‘natural’. From this approach specifically linked to the
queer movement, gender will not refer to man/woman binaries but
to a multiplicity. Butler thus proposes the parodic proliferation of
disruptive genres. Hybrid individuals in whom sex, gender and sexual
orientation do not coincide are considered as new revolutionary subjects.
The deliberate use of a homophobic insult (queer) as the name of
the movement expresses the will to stay outside all redefinition of
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normality. Butler defines ‘queer performativity’ as the ability to reverse
enunciation positions of this decontextualized word when used for the
self-denomination of abject bodies. Neither queer theory and movement,
nor punk post-feminism is aiming for women’s emancipation. They are
not aiming for the normalized integration of gays but for the abolition
of the concept of normality. This consequently places an emphasis upon
sexual dissidences of those considered to be monsters. The theoretician
Beatriz Preciado wishes to depart from a ‘white and middle class’
feminism which focuses on women’s equality.18 Her anti-sexual theory
defines sexuality as a technology and states that the different elements
of the sex/gender system referred to as ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘homosexual’,
‘transsexual’, as well as their practices and sexual identities are only
machines, products or implants.
The cyberpunk feminist Virginie Despentes uses the figure of King
Kong as a metaphor of polymorphous and powerful sexuality preceding
gender categories defined during the Industrial Revolution and other
binary oppositions such as human.19 Referring to the famous final cinema
scene when the monster is born, Despentes remarks that the poor
creature is betrayed by the beautiful blonde who ends up choosing the
hero epitomizing traditional heterosexuality. The death of the monster
allows the return to an established order and symbolizes renunciation
of modern women’s ‘fundamental power’.20 The monster evokes a pre-
Oedipal stage, a metaphor of those excluded because of sex, race or sexual
orientation.
The queer dissolution of frontiers contains the promise of the collapse
of hierarchies. Its concept of transgression has replaced that of sexual
revolution. Resistance and transformation will not lead to new models
of normality, with, for instance, the integration of homosexuality.
Normality is no longer wanted and is attacked by the ‘rebellion
of monsters’, that is to say, with the practices of those which are
‘inappropriate’, those who do not correspond to a model, be it the one
of the One or the Other, those who break away from binaries.
In this sense, queer thinking is strongly influenced by Donna
Haraway, intellectual heiress of Foucault.21 In opposition to the organic
model of resistance against capitalist technological domination in thinkers
such as Marcuse or Carolyn Merchant, Haraway proposes her cyborg,
a hybrid of living organism and machine. This figure synthesizes the
author’s anthropological and political ideas, based on the conviction
that progressive intellectuals must transgress their rejection of the
techno-scientific system, and relinquish the belief in an organic
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body capable of providing resistance. Science and technology must
be embraced because their products alone are capable of effective
deviation from their capitalist and patriarchal programme. A ‘subversive’
misappropriation could be more efficient in gaining power and pleasure.
To reach this end, it is necessary to maintain a double vision of the
cyborg world. On the one hand, we must remain aware that the cyborg
announces a future of total domination of the planet, which is moving
towards the apocalypse of a patriarchal war. On the other hand, it
becomes possible to envisage the possibility of a future when people
would not be frightened of their kinship with animals and machines.22
The political fight, according to Haraway, consists of maintaining both
these visions. In order to undermine an ecofeminism which relies on
organic and spiritual images of Nature and woman, she says ironically
that she ‘would rather be a cyborg than a goddess’.23 Haraway considers
that we do not need cultural rebirths linked to reproduction metaphors
but cybernetic regenerations. Her hope lies in ‘a monstrous world
without gender’.24
Her unexpected writings on the fight of ecologists and ecofeminists
against genetically modified organisms are not so well known.25 She
equates this fight to a certain form of racism which could aim to defend
genetic purity. All the more unexpected is the comparison that she
makes between the demand for healthy food and racial discrimination.
Not unreasonably, the Indian anti-globalization activist Vandana Shiva
replied in no uncertain terms that she would rather be a sacred cow than a
mad cow.26 Behind this blunt response lays a deep reflexion on the effects
of technocapital appropriation of old territories (deterritorialization)
and of the decodification of all preceding meanings that could present
obstacles to the growing privatization brought about by the process of
neoliberal globalization.
Donna Haraway recognizes that she speaks ‘from the belly of the
monster’,27 that is, from the point of view of a society responsible
for hegemonic imperialism. Similarly, she states that she was born in
the family of ‘transgenic, transspecific and transported creatures of all
kinds’.28 The oncomouse, this female created in a laboratory to study
breast cancer, belongs, according to her, to the queer family. Yet, border
transgression is not desirable in every case and does not always represent
liberation interests. Anti-GMO groups are currently fighting a desperate
battle to ensure food sovereignty for each country and biodiversity
preservation. Haraway is aware of this reality and lists all arguments
used by activists. In spite of this, she emphasizes that discussions on
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cross-breeding between organic beings and genes which are alien to them
always connote racism for her.29
For Shiva, this technofeminist position is only an ‘academic
rationalization’ of the war fought against ecologists and organizations
in developing countries which endeavour to resist this destructive
expansion.30 This inappropriate comparison between ecologists and
racists thus seems to create an unexpected left-wing ally for the intense
publicity campaign of multinationals on GMOs and herbicides. It is
true that referring to ‘sanctity of life’31 can have sinister connotations,
in particular for women who have to endure forced pregnancies. In
any case, this type of argument is not the most apt to defend Nature
and women’s freedom. Nevertheless, to be fair to Shiva, we must put
her thinking in its context. Her source of inspiration is Gandhi, who
fought against apartheid in South Africa and for the Indian untouchables.
He also defended vegetarianism on the basis of compassion for ‘our
friends’ and declared that the greatness of a nation and its moral
progress can be judged by the way its animals are treated. Gandhi, who
fought discrimination throughout his life, surely cannot be suspected of
supporting racism or other forms of exclusion.
There is a wide array of positions between ‘sanctity of life’ and
indiscriminate acceptance of all limit transgressions. Haraway is aware
of this. She is searching for a balance between technological progress
and justice when she argues that the establishment of biotechnological
corporations is not bad in itself, if it is scientifically monitored and
operates in a democratic context. She gives the example of Denmark as
model of national and local critical scientific politics.32 She condemns
biopiracy, which, with the means of patents, appropriates biological
resources in unethical ways. Yet her seductive abolition of boundaries
between Nature and Culture comes disconcertingly close to the
arguments of those who, in order to disqualify environmentalism, state
that the natural world is always a product of culture and that there is not
natural space to save.
In its battle against oppressive essentialism, radical constructivism
has been a tool for emancipation from prejudice, but it may become a
sophisticated licence to domination. Let us not forget that in the twenty-
first century, the most frequently crossed borders will probably not be
those of gender or race in the name of freedom or equality, but of
GMOs which destroy biodiversity and traditional agricultural practices.
This will also affect industrially bred animals, lying sick and tortured in
isolation and immobility as new viruses emerge. Even though they are
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herbivores, they are given meat by-products and treated with antibiotics
to keep them alive until they reach the abattoir. International capital is
also another form of intense border crossing as it dictates laws to states
which are no longer listening to their own citizens.
The idea is not to preserve the purity of essences but to keep the
possibility of living an existence worth living. Like a Russian doll, a
healthy body is a system inside ecosystems. These complex and balanced
systems could be lost forever. I agree with Haraway that we must value
and foster the potential progress of technoscience. Yet we shall have
to choose carefully between freedom of choice and what is dictated
externally, which is not always easy. We now must act with caution so as
not to initiate irresponsible and destructive actions. Our lives are growing
more and more hybrid. We use more and more technology. We must
nevertheless remember that enthusiasms awakened by new developments
in communication, medicine or cosmetic care are not synonymous with
undesirable border transgressions and do not imply imposing them to
others.
GMOs are hybrids which spread to neighbouring fields. They require
‘Terminator technology’ herbicide treatments. This name is sufficiently
explicit, as they kill all plants which have not been modified in a
laboratory. Moreover they are carcinogenic and lead to desertification.
The effects of GMOs on human organisms are not fully known yet,
but signs of dangers for health have been identified.33 Can Vandana
Shiva, the International Peasant Movement for Food Sovereignty, and
indigenous people all be considered racist if they reveal that there can be
no democracy when citizens are forced to accept the poisoning of their
soil and the disappearance of their seeds?
In a new Manifesto published in 2003, Donna Haraway replaces the
cyborg with the ‘significant otherness’. She considers ‘natureculture’
hybrids with whom we have loving and responsibility relationships:
dogs.34 For Haraway, dogs are significant others. We ended up being
who we are ‘with’ them. As domestic animals, they are our parents.
We made them and they made us in turn ‘in the symbiogenetic tissues
of naturecultures’.35 This technofeminist considers that her cyborg has
already achieved his/her task: draw attention to the new technological
reality and encourage women to enter the technoscientific universe.
For her, a new figure is needed now. This change does not include
a reversal of her best known epistemological positions, but it throws
light on a relevant metaphorical shift which moves from the world
of machines to the world of non-human consciousness capable of
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feelings. Haraway also observes astutely that the key to new families
does not lie in heterosexuality but in hetero-specificity. This could be
the beginning of a new, non-utilitarian meeting with the Other.36 In
spite of this, her ethical position towards animals remains, in my view,
strongly anthropocentric.37 Her redefinition of Nature as fiction and total
construction offers a perfect alibi for the most substantial exploitation
and devastation. Her great success in the world of intellectuals is
understandable, because of its novelty and its subversive gloss (see
her 1992 essay ‘The Promises of Monsters’).38 Yet the reality is quite
different.
Often, works of science fiction present ideas which use scientific
data to imagine a world where hybrids are the protagonists of a new
nightmarish imaginary sphere. Fictional vampires, monsters and cyborgs
evoke an abhorrent material reality which, whatever interpretations may
be, is obstinately present. We act as parasites, taking blood, milk and
life from captive animals, locking them up until their death in industrial
farms and in laboratories. We also act as vampires in southern countries,
by absorbing a constant flux of resources. Tons of toxic products used by
industrial agriculture destroy much more than Godzilla would be capable
of. The nuclear contamination created by Fukushima will probably
kill more than would die in an attack by aliens. All this, in spite of
a manga written in 1988 by Ryoko Yamagishi, which anticipated the
catastrophe.39
Born out of a nominalist fight against false essences, the concept
of gender has been used very successfully by feminist theories and
movements during the twentieth century. It led to an enormous change
in Western societies. We only need to remember the social organization
of the sexes in a very recent past. This concept is currently a pertinent
question in the sciences, at least in research centres and leading teaching
institutions. The conquest of fundamental rights, formal equality and
demands for real equality are part of the international political agenda.
The social roles of men and women today are much more flexible and
hybrid. Men and women are freer for the very reason that we could
denaturalize the masculine and feminine attributive characteristics and
went on to deconstruct what appeared to be an inevitable biological fate.
Sexual orientation diversity has also gained visibility and support thanks
to the use of a nominalist discourse. Different laws on marriages between
people of the same sex are the proof that there is still a long way to go
before attitudes to exclusion are defeated.
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Yet we can question whether the ‘monstrous world’ of techno-science
will bring true freedom. Behind the luminous face of the liberty and
equality utopia lurks a dystopian side populated with monsters driven
by the greed of economic interests and a blind faith in a technique
which claims to have solutions for all problems. But alas, techno-
scientific knowledge is not able to repair the disasters that it produces.
Catastrophes such as those happening in the Gulf of Mexico or in the
Fukushima atomic plant testify to this fact. Watching this uncertain
future, I cannot hide my surprise in the face of many intellectuals’
indifference towards the destruction of the earth and the efforts of the
new organizations which endeavour to stop it.
We can therefore identify a double face of hybridity. At first sight
we can consider hybrids as a source of symbolic, economic and social
wealth. But a closer examination reveals two facets of hybridity in
the current world: on the one hand some individual liberties, on the
other, constraints and serious risks created by technologies which do
not take into account the complexity and balance of ecosystems. Today,
it is possible to transgress certain unfair and irrational limits such as
those of gender – a right that should have always been ours and that
society denied to us for centuries. Yet in practical terms, the capacity to
cross living borders is primarily used for profit-making hybridation and
transgression rather than for the dismantling of prejudices. Intellectuals
argue that Nature does not exist, that it is only an interpretation. This
new paradigm and our comfortable position prevent us from seeing that
border transgression is not desirable when it implies the destruction
of the natural diversity of the non-human world. Hyperconstructivism
is the cultural corollary of neoliberal productivism. Herein resides the
Janusian heritage of nominalism. How to preserve freedom without
entering a nightmare of monsters and cyborgs, of suffering and death,
remains to be considered. This will be a very difficult task facing
ecofeminist criticism in the twenty-first century.40
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